

A Conceptual Framework for Social Entrepreneurship and Social Innovation in Mexico

Un marco conceptual para el emprendimiento y la innovación social en México

Dr. Hans Lundberg*

Artículo recibido: 08-06-2019

Aprobado: 09-12-2019

Resumen

Para que el emprendimiento social y la innovación social despeguen de verdad en México, se deben abordar y eliminar, o reducir, dos obstáculos principales a nivel estructural. Estos impedimentos son de carácter *material* y *discursivo*; el de naturaleza materialista se refiere al poder persistente de la vieja costumbre por el dinero, de las viejas élites, las viejas soluciones, el viejo pensamiento y las viejas formas de organizar la actividad económica que aún domina la vida económica y social en México. Este inhibidor material se entrelaza con el discursivo, ya que los viejos representantes en el poder hábilmente usan un “vocabulario nuevo y fresco” para oscurecer, distorsionar y desdibujar actividades que todavía se basan en la lógica del antiguo régimen.

* Profesor Investigador de la Escuela de Emprendimiento Social e Innovación (EDES), Universidad Iberoamericana Ciudad de México.
Correo electrónico:
hans.lundberg@ibero.mx

Abstract

In order for social entrepreneurship and social innovation to take off for real in Mexico, two major inhibitors on structural level needs to be addressed and eliminated/reduced. One inhibitor is material and the other is discursive in nature. The *material inhibitor* is the lingering power of old money, old elites, old solutions, old thinking, and old ways of organizing economic activity that still dominates economic and social life in Mexico. Inter-twinning with this *material inhibitor* is the discursive inhibitor; the skills of old power representatives in using “new and fresh vocabulary” to discursively obscure, blur and distort that their activities still are based on the aforementioned old power logic. The purpose of this article is to contribute to remedy the problem with the discursive inhibitor, via proposing an actionable conceptual framework for social entrepreneurs and social innovators in Mexico. If achieving some success on the discursive arenas, gains and wins therefrom can be used to take on the material inhibitor on the political-legal arenas. The henequen industry in Yucatan is used as an illustrative case to support the purpose.

Keywords: Conceptual Framework, Social Entrepreneurship, Social Innovation, Mexico, Henequen Industry.

Palabras clave: Marco conceptual, Emprendimiento social, Innovación social, México, Industria del henequén.

Introduction

The need for Social Entrepreneurship (SE) and Social Innovation (SI) in Mexico is vast and recognized by essential Mexican institutions. The conditions for SE and SI are partly favorable on structural level, as Mexico has strong traditions in the social and solidarity economy in various regions/states and thereby a solid track record in co-operative and collaborative ways of organizing economic activity (Oulhaj & Gallegos, 2017). This tradition includes a focus on alternatives to mainstream finance that are more inclusive and solidary (Oulhaj, 2016; Oulhaj & Lévesque, 2015), a focus on the existing backbone of Mexican economy (small and medium-sized firms and family businesses) (Lundberg & Ramírez-Pasillas, 2017, Lundberg et al., 2019; Ramírez-Pasillas et al., 2018;) and an emerging focus on untapped potentials of the Mexican economy (indigenous entrepreneurs, immigrant/migrant entrepreneurs, subsistence entrepreneurs and community based entrepreneurs) (Lundberg et al., 2019; Ramírez-Pasillas et al., 2019; Lundberg & Ramírez-Pasillas, 2020). Two other structural aspects are although major inhibitors for SE and SI to take off for real in Mexico. One is material and one is discursive in nature. The *material inhibitor* is the lingering power of old money, old elites, old solutions, old thinking, and old ways of organizing economic activity (“Mexico Inc.” and “Grupo Mexico”) (Lanoue, 1999; Hodge & Coronado, 2006) that still controls Mexican society and economy at large (Lanoue, 2001). The most obvious way old power manifest itself is that not much has changed since the Mexican Revolution regarding development fundamentals such as land ownership, control of means of production and access to credits and capital. The improvements during the Cardenas presidency (the Ejido-reforms) in the 1930s lasted for about half a decade but is gradually rolled back to what’s always been the case in Mexico since the conquest (local Mexican/Spanish elites and foreign interests collaborate to buy and control anything essential) as a consequence of the 1992 Agrarian law. Inter-twinning with this material inhibitor is the discursive inhibitor; the skills of old power representatives in using “new and fresh vocabulary” to discursively obscure, blur and distort

that their activities still are based on the aforementioned old power logic. In order for SE and SI to take off for real in Mexico, both these structural problems need to be solved. The *material inhibitor* is a political-legal problem, which in this text empirically will be illustrated by recent but flawed attempts to revitalize the Yucatan-based henequen industry (Iglesias, 2014). With the henequen industry serving as an empirical illustration of the material problem, the purpose of this article is to propose an actionable conceptual framework for SE and SI actors in Mexico, as they need an updated and powerful conceptual framework to act upon in order to try to remedy the discursive inhibitor. If achieving some success on the discursive arenas, gains and wins therefrom can be used to take on the material inhibitor on the political-legal arenas.

The Henequen Industry: Old Power and their Outsourcing Strategies

Visiting the *Palacio de Gobierno del Estado de Yucatán* in Merida, Mexico, is a paradoxical experience. The stunning elegance of the place (Figure 1) combined with the almost 400 years of enormous brutality its murals communicate (Figure 2) creates a major contrast effect.



Figure 1. Panoramic view of Palacio de Gobierno del Estado de Yucatán, Merida, Mexico.

Source: Lundberg, H. (photographer). August 2017.



Figure 2. *Venta de Indios* (mural of the trade of Mayan slaves, 1848-1861).

Source: Lundberg, H. (photographer). August 2017; mural by Fernando Castro Pacheco in Palacio de Gobierno del Estado de Yucatán, Merida, Mexico.

The serie of 27 murals completed 1971-1979, *Evolución Social del Hombre en Yucatán* by Fernando Castro Pacheco (1918-2013), is a mind-blowing and eye-boggling account of the brutality by which the Spanish conquerors, the Spanish crown and the catholic church enslaved and controlled the indigenous peoples of Yucatán during almost 400 years (from the conquest of Yucatán by Francisco de Montejo Sr. and Jr., 1520-1540 to the social emancipation reforms by Salvador Alvarado, 1915-1918). The key mechanism used in the process of conquering Yucatán and the long periods of dominion and exploitation that followed is, with a modern concept, that of 'outsourcing':

The great conquests in the Indies were made at no direct cost to the Crown. They were achieved by the greater conquistadores upon their own initiative and at their own expense under specific authorization from the sovereign. Those who took service under the greater conquistadores also bore their own expenses with respect to arms, horses, equipment, and sustenance. Certain of the more important, as subordinate captains, raised companies and groups which they themselves equipped. The conquest of the southern provinces of Yucatan, Uaymil, and Chetemal, by the Pachecos under authority of the Adelantado is an important example of such practice. Individual conquistadores also frequently brought with them squires and servants. Arms, supplies, horses and equipment, it should be pointed out, were normally extremely costly in the Indies. The soldier-colonists consequently, as well as the great captains, incurred heavy expenses and indebtedness. Both the greater and the lesser conquistadores looked to the conquered lands and their peoples to afford compensation for the expenses which they incurred and the hardships and dangers which they underwent and to give recompense for the trials and uncertainties of colonization, and the Crown in granting or tacitly authorizing such reward achieved its purposes at no direct cost to the royal coffers (Chamberlain, 1939, pp. 239-240).

Outsourcing in multiple layers and tiers, where risks and costs were pushed downwards in the outsourcing hierarchy with the promise of major profits and advantages held up at the horizon, all-in-all functioned as an extraordinary effective mechanism for brutality and maximum exploitation, as everyone in the hierarchy had much to lose if showing lenience, tolerance and a soft stance and had everything to gain from showing the opposite. The perception that this was not only the way to do it but also the morally just and right way to do it was achieved when the Pope sanctioned it as a divine right:

The Crown considered its claims to dominion over the New World to be juridically above question, as the lands and peoples of the Americas had been given into the power of the sovereigns of Castile by the Pope. In accord with this theory, it was not only the right of the Castilian monarchs to bring the New World under their control, but their obligation, and in so doing they regarded principles of divine and natural law and justice, thus to maintain just title. The natives of the Indies were already their vassals and were obligated to acknowledge their dominion, and in establishing effective control they were making actual a condition which already existed in theory. Natives who did not immediately accept their dominion were consequently "in rebellion" against their rightful lords (Chamberlain, 1939, pp. 231-232).



Figure 3. *El Henequen.*
Mural by Fernando Castro Pacheco in Palacio de Gobierno del Estado de Yucatán, Merida, Mexico.
Source: Lundberg, H. (photographer). August 2017.

At the heart of this brutality in the later part of these almost 400 years, from mid 1800's to early 1900's, was the henequen industry (Figure 3):

With the technological innovation of the decorticator (desfibradora), a mechanical device [that] was invented and perfected by Yucatecans during the 1850's, was the industry able to cut production costs and meet rising demand. Desfibradoras soon became standard operating equipment on all large plantations. By 1860, rasping machines each, on average, produced more than a bale (350 pounds) of fiber a day. Improvements in technology continued throughout the auge, and with the introduction of steam power to the machine house in 1861, henequen production soared (Wells, 1982, p. 229).



Figure 4-5. A decorticator (desfibradora) at the José María Morelos plant between Motul and Telchac Puerto.
Source: Lundberg, H. (photographer). August 2017.

What then followed is a well-researched (Joseph & Wells, 1982; Brannon & Baklanoff, 1987; Wells, 1992; Yoder, 1993; Ramírez, 1994; Garcia de Fuentes & Morales, 2000; Alston et al., 2008; Andrews et al., 2012) economic boom for the henequen industry that lasted for about 50 years (Figure 6):




Figure 6. Henequen production, 1873-1915. **Source:** Joseph & Wells, 1982, p. 71.

At large, this period coincided with the Porfiriato, in which even harder conditions were imposed on the indigenous peoples of Yucatán: During the era of Porfirio Diaz (1876-1911) the misery of the nation’s large Indian population increased substantially. Pick up any recent scholarly work on modern Mexico, and you will probably find a documented account of the way in which Diaz’ policies intensified the sufferings of an already oppressed people (Powell, 1968, p. 19). In play in this period were not direct or explicit outsourcing mechanisms but indirect and covert outsourcing-alike mechanisms that, above all, managed to obscure the fact that the remarkable economic progress in Mexico during this period was achieved by three factors: 1) by Porfirio Diaz selling most parts of Mexico to foreign interest, 2) by laying the foundation of the Master-and-Servant economic logic based on extreme unequal distribution of wealth that remain until this day in Mexico and 3) by the enslavement of the indigenous peoples of Yucatán. These outsourcing-alike mechanisms were financial in nature and achieved effectively a well-known effect of outsourcing, that of blurred lines of accountability leading to that no single actor or organization in the chain of various layers and tiers making up the outsourcing structure can be held responsible for various failures (Farrow et al., 2015). These more sophisticated and covert forms of control based on elaborated credit and financing schemes were controlled from the USA but benefitted equally their allies, the few ruling families in Yucatán that were reaping the enormous benefits from the Henequen boom:

The peninsular henequen industry was penetrated and controlled indirectly. The means of production, the plantations themselves, continued to remain in Yucatecan hands, while the North American cordage interests, in collaboration with selected regional agents, increasingly extended their control over local henequen production by means of onerous credit arrangements backed by fiber liens. By 1910, these U.S. cordage manufacturers, now consolidated into a veritable trust centered upon the International Harvester Company (established in 1902), controlled upwards of 99 percent of the regional fiber supply and, through their Yucatecan agents, appeared able to influence –indeed, even to dictate– price trends on the local fiber market (Joseph & Wells, 1982, p. 71).

As so often in historical and contemporary Mexico, the contrasts are to be found all around us and in immediate vicinity to each other: Immediately when entering the beautiful ex-hacienda henequenera, [Hacienda Uayamón](#) in Campeche, one gets a more-than-enough obvious illustration of the enormous wealth accumulated (Figure 6). But less than 100 meters from the main building, just by slipping into the nearby jungle, one finds the remaining of the house where enslaved indigenous peoples of Yucatán having upset their Master was thrown in, alive, to fade away into death (Figure 7):



Figure 7. Entrance to Hacienda Uayamón, Campeche.
Source: Lundberg, H. (photographer). December 2017.



Figure 8. House where slaves were left to die.
Source: Lundberg, H. (photographer). December 2017.

To conclude the case, we need to jump another 100 years forward, to contemporary affairs in Yucatán and within the henequen industry. Recent attempts to revitalize the henequen industry is done with the “new code word” for upholding blurred lines of accountability, the so called Private-Public Partnerships (PPP). PPP schemes are prey to being used for frauds and embezzlement of public money via elaborated co-financing schemes (Hall, 2014; The World Bank Group, 2013). PPP schemes has been used frequently during the neo-liberal regime in Mexico since the 1980’s, quite some apparently successfully, some other cases with an air of suspicion around them. Few cases have led to courts and convictions, though.

So, it is too early to say something concrete legally about what locally now is known as another “White Elephant” in Yucatán, the case of *Mayan Tejidos*. What can be said with certainty though, is that eventual beneficiaries of *Mayan Tejidos* does not include the indigenous peoples of Yucatán but do include new versions of the same old powers analyzed above:

As a white elephant remains the henequen fiber products factory “Mayan Tejidos”, which so far does not work after the multi-million investment that was made for its construction, denounced the President of Asociación de Parcelarios Autónomos de Yucatán, Bernardino Martín Chan. He recalled that the company had an investment cost of 300 million pesos, a mixture of federal, state and business resources, and so far, it still does not work. At the outset, 100 people were trained, to whom there were problems to pay the corresponding salary, why after having worked for a time, the plant closed five years ago, in 2014. “About nine years after the plant was built, in the government of Ivonne Ortega Pacheco, it was intended to acquire local henequen fiber production to process and industrialize in various export products, which would benefit some 18,000 men from field,” said Martín Chan. He also said that it was planned to export 90 percent of the production of yarns and fine fabrics based on long fiber to European, North American and Asian markets, but the plan did not materialize. He indicated that the operation of this factory would be for the benefit of the municipalities that make up the area where “green gold” once found its peak and about 1,200 direct jobs and about 19,200 indirect jobs would be generated. “Another plan was to plant 2,500 hectares of henequen, in an inclusive investment concept that facilitates access to better input prices for small and medium-sized producers, but it was only in words,” said the President of the Asociación de Parcelarios Autónomos de Yucatán. He said he does not know the reason why “Mayan Tejidos” remains closed. He noted that there are guards on the premises that remain in place (Can, 2019; translation from Spanish by author).

Note the words towards the end, “*but it was only words*”; not so innocent as it may seem, on the contrary –a very deliberate use of the discursive inhibitor described in the introduction. When analyzing regional development policy and industrial strategies in Yucatán the last two decades, Iglesias (2014) concludes regarding the most recent variant of the long lineage of outsourcing mechanisms used in Yucatán:

Increasing economic outsourcing has meant a growth in labor subcontracting, unemployment and informality. To all of that, we must add increasing urban

concentration, a result of migration from rural areas, and a lack of public policies to deal with it. There is currently no project that includes agricultural development that might consider this migrant labor from rural areas. These people now swell the ranks of the informal labor market. Similarly, there are no significant plans for endogenous agro-industrial developments that might slow these inequalities and imbalances in the state's economic growth (p. 8).

To sum up; almost 500 years of old power ruling the whereabouts of Yucatán overall and the henequen industry, in particular, has led to a minimum of sustainable development for the indigenous peoples of Yucatán and to a maximum of benefits and profits for representatives of old power.

Proposed Conceptual Framework for Social Entrepreneurship and Social Innovation in Mexico

The task of undoing old powers and their control over material and discursive inhibitors is a daunting one, why it is here proposed to start such a task on the discursive arenas. The conceptual framework here presented is derived from five state-of-the-art typologies from the international scientific literature in the areas of SE and SI. Table I provides an overview of these five contributions as well as which elements that are taken from each contribution respectively.

Author/s and year	Title and Journal	Element Taken
Lubberink, Blok, van Ophem, van der Velde, & Omta (2018).	Innovation for Society: Towards a Typology of Developing Innovations by Social Entrepreneurs. <i>Journal of Social Entrepreneurship</i> , 9(1), pp. 52-78.	Four <i>typologies</i> of developing innovative solutions for social problems by social entrepreneurs.
Macke, Rubim, Domeneghini & da Silva (2018).	Where Do We Go from Now? Research Framework for Social Entrepreneurship. <i>Journal of Cleaner Production</i> , 183(10), pp. 677-685.	Six <i>definitions</i> of social entrepreneurship.
Mair, Battilana & Cardenas (2012).	Organizing for Society: A Typology of Social Entrepreneurial Models. <i>Journal of Business Ethics</i> , 111, pp. 353-373.	Four <i>types</i> of social entrepreneurial models based on four types of capital.
Peredo & McLean (2006).	Social Entrepreneurship: A Critical Review of the Concept. <i>Journal of World Business</i> , 41(1), pp. 56-65.	Four <i>ranges</i> of social entrepreneurship.
Zahra, Gedajlovic, Neubaum, & Shulman (2009).	A Typology of Social Entrepreneurs: Motives, Search Processes, and Ethical Challenges. <i>Journal of Business Venturing</i> , 24(5), pp. 519-532.	Three <i>scopes</i> of social entrepreneurship and social innovation.

Table I. Overview of data sample used to theoretically derive a conceptual model for SE and SI in Mexico.

Source: Author's creation.

In detail, the elements taken from each contribution respectively are as follows: From Lubberink et al. (2018), the four typologies of developing innovative solutions for social problems by social entrepreneurs are displayed in Table 2:

TYPE DIMENSION	Rushing	Wayfinders	Rigid visionaries	Negotiating visionaries
Anticipation	The social needs are well understood before determining the desirable solution. Sufficient scenarios are in place to implement the solution.	They understand the social needs before determining the desirable solution and thought of sufficient scenarios to implement the solution. However, they stick less to following a plan for development.	They follow and stick to their plan as to how to develop the solution for the societal problem. This is determined after they fully understand the social needs to address. Sufficient scenarios are in place to implement the innovation.	They follow a plan for development. They fully understand the social needs before determining the desirable innovation outcome and think of sufficient scenarios to implement the solution.
Reflexivity	They work forcefully towards a solution but could better think it through as they do neither reflect on their own norms, values, and beliefs nor whether their innovation is on the right track.	Their innovation is driven by their own norms, values, and beliefs. And people with diverse personal and professional backgrounds share their perspectives on how to develop the innovation.	They are highly reflexive as they reflect whether their decision-making is in line with their own norms, values, and beliefs. Furthermore, they frequently assess whether their innovation is going in the right direction.	They frequently assess whether the innovation is still going in the desirable direction. However, they do not reflect whether their decision-making is in line with their own norms, values, and beliefs.
Stakeholders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Community/ people affected - Customers/ suppliers - Experts/ consultants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Community/ people affected - NGOs - Customers/ suppliers - Experts/ consultants - Other entrepreneurs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Community/ people affected - NGOs - Customers/ suppliers - Experts/ consultants - Other entrepreneurs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Community/ people affected - NGOs - Experts/ consultants - Research institutes
Stakeholder engagement	The stakeholders were not involved throughout the whole innovation process and do not always house the expertise, know-how, and organizational skills to contribute to the innovation.	They have a diverse but resource-poor stakeholder network. The stakeholders do not have the commitment, knowledge or organizational skills to contribute to the innovation nor are they involved throughout the innovation process.	Well-functioning stakeholder network including community representatives. The stakeholders are involved and committed throughout the innovation process and house the right expertise and organizational skills.	Well-functioning stakeholder network including community representatives. The stakeholders are involved and committed throughout the innovation process and house the right expertise and organizational skills.

<p>Deliberation</p>	<p>Transparent innovation process where information is shared with stakeholders. However, relatively few dialogues are organized that help to overcome differences in stakeholder interests. And they are less open to stakeholders regarding their decision-making.</p>	<p>The innovation process is transparent and activities are organized to encourage dialogue among stakeholders, which help to overcome differences in stakeholders' interests. However, the entrepreneurs make sure that they remain in power with regard to decision-making.</p>	<p>The innovation process is transparent and the stakeholders had sufficient information to form their opinion about the innovation. Furthermore, they organize sufficient dialogues to help overcome different stakeholders' interests. However, the stakeholders have relatively little decision-making power.</p>	<p>Their participatory innovation process is very transparent. Stakeholders have access to the information necessary to form an opinion about the innovation. Moreover, they have actual decision-making power to guide the innovation in the desirable direction. Dialogues are organized to overcome differences between stakeholders' interests.</p>
<p>Responsiveness</p>	<p>They do not deviate from their initial idea as to what the innovation outcome should be. They are capable to adjust the innovation if that were deemed necessary.</p>	<p>The entrepreneurs and their stakeholders are mutually responsive as the innovation process and outcome are different from their initial idea; and the stakeholders need to adapt to the innovation to allow its implementation.</p>	<p>They do not deviate from their initial plan for development or the determined innovation outcome. Even though they are capable to adjust the innovation, it is only the stakeholders who adapt to allow implementation of the innovation.</p>	<p>Entrepreneur and stakeholders are mutually responsive to each other as the process and innovation outcome is different from the initial idea. And stakeholders had to adapt to allow implementation of the innovation.</p>
<p>Knowledge management</p>	<p>Creating knowledge within the organization or with actors beyond their organization receives negligible attention.</p>	<p>They act as bricoleurs as they continuously scan for knowledge, and absorb and/or develop knowledge together with their external stakeholders.</p>	<p>Highly engaged in intraorganizational knowledge creation and at the same time developing knowledge together with stakeholders or absorbing it from them.</p>	<p>Staff members scan and bring in missing knowledge into the organization. However, they are less intensively engaged in intraorganizational knowledge creation or developing knowledge together with stakeholders.</p>

Table 2. Four typologies of developing innovative solutions for social problems by social entrepreneurs.
Source: Lubberink et al., 2018, p. 70.

Take-away from Table 2: For Mexican and Yucatán contexts, the Wayfinders type is recommended. From Macke et al. (2018), the six definitions of social entrepreneurship are displayed in Table 3:

Source	Definition
Canadian Centre for Social Entrepreneurship (2001, p.1)	“The CCSE defines ‘social entrepreneurship’ broadly to encompass a variety of initiatives which fall into two broad categories. First, in the for-profit sector, social entrepreneurship encompasses activities emphasizing the importance of a socially engaged private sector; and the benefits that accrue to those who ‘do well by doing good.’ Second, it refers to activities encouraging more entrepreneurial approaches in the not-for-profit sector in order to increase organizational effectiveness and foster long-term sustainability”.
School for Social Entrepreneurs (2015, p. 1)	“A social enterprise is a business driven by a social or environmental purpose. As with all businesses, social enterprises compete to deliver goods and services. The difference is that social purpose is at the very heart of what they do, and the profits they make are reinvested towards achieving that purpose. There is no template for social entrepreneurs; they employ a diverse range of approaches and are people of different ages, backgrounds, gender, interests, and expertise. What they share are entrepreneurial skills and allegiance to a social mission or purpose”.
Ashoka (2015, p.1)	“Social entrepreneurs are individuals with innovative solutions to society’s most pressing social problems. They are ambitious and persistent, tackling major social issues and offering new ideas for wide-scale change. (...) Social entrepreneurs present user-friendly, understandable, and ethical ideas that engage widespread support in order to maximize the number of citizens that will stand up, seize their idea, and implement it. Leading social entrepreneurs are mass recruiters of local change makers”.
Institute for Social Entrepreneurship (ISE) (2015, p.3)	A Social Entrepreneur is a person who “applies his or her business expertise to create social value; and who provides smart solutions to community problems by thinking like an entrepreneur. Traditionally, entrepreneurs have trained their focus on products, services and profits”. ISE believes that “entrepreneurs can do more - and are often expected to. Above and beyond business ‘as usual,’ they leverage their skills and resources to address serious needs, expand their impact and bolster the communities, neighbourhoods, schools and services in the places they do business”.
Research Centre on Social Innovations Canada (2015)	Social innovations come from individuals, groups or organizations, and can take place in the for-profit, non-profit and public sectors. Increasingly, they are happening in the spaces between these three sectors as perspectives collide to spark new ways of thinking”.
European Commission (2013, p. 17)	“The term social entrepreneurship is used to describe the behaviours and attitudes of individuals involved in creating new ventures for social purposes, including the willingness to take risks and find creative ways of using underused assets”.

Table 3. Six definitions of social entrepreneurship.

Source: Macke et al., 2018, p. 678.

Take-away from Table 3: For Mexican and Yucatán contexts, the Ashoka definition is recommended.

From Mair et al. (2012), the four types of social entrepreneuring models based on four types of capital are defined as follows:

- 1) *Social capital* “refers to networks of relationships through which individuals can mobilize power and resources” (Mair et al., 2012, p. 361).
- 2) *Human capital* “refers to individuals’ knowledge, skills, and acquired expertise” (Mair et al., 2012, p. 361).
- 3) *Economic capital* “includes money and other material resources” (Mair et al., 2012, p. 361).
- 4) *Political capital* “refers to citizens’ endowment, empowerment, and political identity” (Mair et al., 2012, p. 360).

Take-away from Mair et al. 2012: For Mexican and Yucatán contexts, an extra-ordinary focus on *social and human capital* is recommended, given the historical and contemporary abuse of in particular these capital forms. The other two forms, economic and political capital, can never be ignored, but as these have been the root sources for old power to draw upon, it is wiser to deal with these secondary and instead focus on social and human capital forms primary.

From Peredo & McLean (2006), the five ranges of social entrepreneurship are displayed in Table 4:

Place of Social Goals	Role of Commercial Exchange	Example
Enterprise goals are exclusively social.	No commercial exchange.	NGOs
Enterprise goals are chiefly social, but not exclusively.	Some commercial exchange, any profits directly to social benefit ('integrated') or in support of enterprise ('complimentary').	Grameen Bank ('integrated'); Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee printing press, cold storage, garment factory ('complimentary'), Newman's Own.
Enterprise goals are chiefly social, but not exclusively.	Commercial exchange; profits in part to benefit entrepreneur and/or supporters.	Missouri Home Care, Ciudad Salud.
Social goals are prominent among other goals of the enterprise.	Commercial exchange; profit-making to entrepreneur & others is strong objective.	Ben & Jerry's
Social goals are among the goals of the enterprise, but subordinate to others.	Commercial exchange; profit-making to entrepreneur & others is prominent or prime objective.	'Cause-branding'; social objectives undertaken by corporations such as banks.

Table 4. Five ranges of social entrepreneurship.

Source: Peredo & McLean, 2006, p. 63.

Take-away from Table 4: For Mexican and Yucatán contexts, the fourth range (*Social goals are prominent among other goals of the enterprise*) is recommended. This, because the need for genuine economic and political empowerment most often goes via economic stability and *full ownership of and control*

over the mechanisms leading to that. Note that this needs to be combined with the aforementioned focus on social and human capital. This is a mean-to-ends logic; focus on *social and human capital* in order to achieve economic and political empowerment, not the other way around.

Finally, from Zahra et al. (2009), the three scopes of social entrepreneurship and social innovation. Are displayed in Table 5:

	Social Bricoleur	Social Constructionists	Social Engineer
Theoretical inspiration	Hayek	Kirzner	Schumpeter
What they do?	Perceive and act upon opportunities to address a local social need they are motivated and have the expertise and resources to address.	Build and operate alternative structures to provide goods and services addressing social needs that governments, agencies, and businesses cannot.	Creation of newer, more effective social systems designed to replace existing ones when they are ill-suited to address significant social needs.
Scale, scope and timing	Small scale, local in scope —often episodic in nature.	Small to large scale, local to international in scope, designed to be institutionalized to address an ongoing social need.	Very large scale that is national to international in scope and which seeks to build lasting structures that will challenge existing order.
Why they are necessary?	Knowledge about social needs and the abilities to address them are widely scattered. Many social needs are non-discernable or easily misunderstood from afar, requiring local agents to detect and address them.	Laws, regulation, political acceptability, inefficiencies and/or lack of will prevent existing governmental and business organizations from addressing many important social needs effectively.	Some social needs are not amenable to amelioration within existing social structures. Entrenched incumbents can thwart actions to address social needs that undermine their own interests and source of power.
Social significance	Collectively, their actions help maintain social harmony in the face of social problems.	They mend the social fabric where it is torn, address acute social needs within existing broader social structures, and help maintain social harmony.	They seek to rip apart existing social structures and replace them with new ones. They represent an important force for social change in the face of entrenched incumbents.
Effect on social equilibrium	Atomistic actions by local social entrepreneurs move us closer to a theoretical “social equilibrium.”	Addressing gaps in the provision of socially significant goods and service creates new “social equilibriums.”	Fractures existing social equilibrium and seeks to replace it with a more socially efficient one.

<p>Source of discretion</p>	<p>Being on the spot with the skills to address local problems not on others “radars.” Local scope means they have limited resource requirements and are fairly autonomous. Small scale and local scope allow for quick response times.</p>	<p>They address needs left un- addressed and have limited/ no competition. They may even be welcomed and be seen as a “release valve” preventing negative publicity/ social problems that may adversely affect existing governmental and business organizations.</p>	<p>Popular support to the extent that existing social structures and incumbents are incapable of addressing important social needs.</p>
<p>Limits to discretion</p>	<p>Not much aside from local laws and regulations. However, the limited resources and expertise they possess limit their ability to address other needs or expand geographically.</p>	<p>Need to acquire financial and human resources necessary to fulfill mission and institutionalize as a going concern. Funder demands oversight. Professional volunteers and employees are needed to operate organization.</p>	<p>Seen as fundamentally illegitimate by established parties that see them as a threat, which brings scrutiny and attempts to undermine the ability of the social engineers to bring about change. The perceived illegitimacy will inhibit the ability to raise financial and human resources from traditional sources. As a consequence, they may become captive of the parties that supply it with needed resources.</p>

Table 5. Three scopes social entrepreneurship.

Source: Zahra et al., 2009, p. 523.

Take-away from Table 5: For Mexican and Yucatán contexts, the second scope of activity, *the social constructionist*, is recommended. This, because the first one, social bricoleur aims to low and would lock-in the indigenous social entrepreneurs and social innovators of Yucatán into old roles and known dependencies, while the large scale of the third one maybe can be aimed at once the second scope is achieved and consolidated.

In conclusion, the five essential components of the here proposed conceptual framework for social entrepreneurship and social innovation in Mexico in general and in Yucatan in particular are: 1) *The Wayfinder Typology* of developing innovative solutions for social problems by social entrepreneurs (Lubberink et al., 2018, p. 70), 2) *The Asoka Definition* of social entrepreneurship (Macke et al., 2018, p. 678), 3) a focus on social and human capital as *The Type of Social Entrepreneurship Model* most suitable for Mexican contexts (Mair et al., 2012, pp. 360-361), 4) a moderate and balanced position when it comes to *The Range of Social Entrepreneurship*, one where social goals are prominent among other goals of the enterprise, as genuine economic and political empowerment often goes via economic stability and full ownership of and control over the mechanisms leading to that (Peredo & McLean, 2006, p. 63), and finally, 5) *The Social Constructionist Scope* of social entrepreneurship and social innovation (Zahra et al., 2009, p. 523) is recommended for Mexican contexts, as it balances high ambitions with realistic feasibility.

References

- Alston, L., Mattiace, S., & Nonnenmacher, T. (March, 2008). Coercion, Culture and Debt Contracts: The Henequen Industry in Yucatan, Mexico, 1870-1915. *National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)*. Working Paper No. 13852. Retrieved February 21, 2019 from <https://www.nber.org/papers/w13852.pdf>.
- Andrews, A. P., Burgos Villanueva, R., & Millet Cámara, L. (March, 2012). The Henequen Ports of Yucatan's Gilded Age. *International Journal of Historical Archaeology*, 16(1), pp. 25-46. Doi: 10.1007/s10761-012-0168-z.
- Brannon, J., & Baklanoff, E. N. (1987). *Agrarian Reform and Public Enterprise in Mexico: The Political Economy of Yucatan's Henequen Industry*. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press.
- Can Tec, M. (2019). Fábrica lleva cinco años sin operar. *Diario de Yucatán*. Retrieved February 21, 2019 from <https://www.yucatan.com.mx/yucatan/fabrica-lleva-cinco-anos-sin-operar>.
- Chamberlain, R. S. (September, 1939). Spanish Methods of Conquest and Colonization in Yucatan, 1527-1550. I. *The Scientific Monthly*, 49(3), pp. 227-244. Retrieved February 21, 2019 from www.jstor.org/stable/17057.
- Farrow, K., Hurley, S., & Sturrock, R. (2015). *Grand Alibis: How Declining Public Sector Capability Affects Services for the Disadvantaged*. Sydney: Centre for Policy Development. Retrieved January 14, 2020 from <https://cpd.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Grand-Alibis-Final.pdf>.
- García de Fuentes, A., & Morales, J. (February, 2000). Dinámica Regional de Yucatán 1980-2000. *Investigaciones Geográficas*, 42, pp. 157-172. Retrieved January 14, 2020 from <http://www.scielo.org.mx/pdf/igeo/n42/n42a10.pdf>.
- Hall, D. (2014). *Why Public-Private Partnership Don't Work. The Many Advantages of the Public Alternative*. London: University of Greenwich, Public Services International Research Unit. Retrieved January 14, 2020 from <http://biblioteca.semarnat.gob.mx/janium/Documentos/Ciga/Libros2013/CD0029713.pdf>.
- Hodge, B., & Coronado, G. (July, 2006). Mexico Inc.? Discourse Analysis and the Triumph of Managerialism. *Organization*, 13(4), pp. 529-547. Doi: 1350508406065104.
- Iglesias, E. (April, 2014). Travesías del Desarrollo en Yucatan. Problemas del Desarrollo. *Revista Latinoamericana de Economía*, 45(177), pp. 169-192. Retrieved January 14, 2020 from <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301703614708673>.
- Joseph, G. M., & Wells, A. (1982). Corporate Control of a Monocrop Economy: International Harvester and Yucatan's Henequen Industry during the Porfiriato. *Latin American Research Review*, 17(1), pp. 69-99. Retrieved January 14, 2020 from www.jstor.org/stable/2503029.
- Lanoue, D. B. (August, 1999). A Historical Analysis of the International Business Perspectives of Mexican Industrial Groups. *Journal of Management History*, 5(5), pp. 252-268. Doi: 13552529910282240.
- Lanoue, D. B. (December, 2001). The Role of Big Business in the Economic Integration of Latin America. *International Journal of Organization Theory and Behaviour*, 4, pp. 57-73. Doi: OTB-100103035.

- Lubberink, R., Blok, V., van Ophem, J., van der Velde, G., & Omta, O. (December, 2018). Innovation for Society: Towards a Typology of Developing Innovations by Social Entrepreneurs. *Journal of Social Entrepreneurship*, 9, pp. 52-78. Doi: 19420676.2017.1410212.
- Lundberg, H., & Ramírez-Pasillas, E. (2017). Contextualizing Entrepreneurship as an Antidote to Institutional Evangelizing: Diezmo and Informal Contract Commissions in Mexico. In Brundin, E., Markowska, M. & Ramírez-Pasillas, M. (Eds.), *Contextualizing Entrepreneurship in Emerging Economies and Developing Countries* (pp. 80-91). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Lundberg, H., & Ramírez-Pasillas, M. (2020). The Other Within as Entrepreneurial Agency for Subsistence Entrepreneurs. In Ratten, V. (Ed.), *Entrepreneurship and the Community. Contributions to Management Science* (pp. 7-27). Cham: Springer Nature.
- Lundberg, H., Ramírez-Pasillas, M., Dana, L-P., & Evansluong, Q. (2019). *Social Enterprising for Immigrant Inclusion: An Organizing Context Approach*. Conference Paper presented at the Organizing Migration and Integration in Contemporary Societies Conference. Gothenburg University, Sweden.
- Macke, J., Rubim, J. A., Domeneghini, J., & da Silva, K. A. (February, 2018). Where do we go from Now? Research Framework for Social Entrepreneurship. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 183, pp. 677-685. Doi: 10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.02.017.
- Mair, J., Battilana, J., & Cardenas, J. (August, 2012). Organizing for Society: A Typology of Social Entrepreneurial Models. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 111(3), pp. 353-373. Doi: 10.1007/s10551-012-1414-3.
- Oulhaj, L. (Ed.). (2016). *Avanzar en la Inclusión Financiera*. Mexico City: Universidad Iberoamericana.
- Oulhaj, L., & Gallegos, X. (Coords.). (2017). *Economía Social y Solidaria, Migración y Género: Hacia la Búsqueda de Alternativas de "Desarrollo". Una Reflexión Interdisciplinaria desde México*. Mexico City: Universidad Iberoamericana.
- Oulhaj, L., & Lévesque, B. (Coords.). (2015). *Las Finanzas Solidarias en Algunos Países de América: ¿Hacia un Sistema y un Ecosistema de Economía Social y Solidaria?* Mexico City: Universidad Iberoamericana.
- Peredo, A. M., & McLean, M. (July, 2006). Social Entrepreneurship: A Critical Review of the Concept. *Journal of World Business*, 41(1), pp. 56-65. Doi: 10.1016/j.jwb.2005.10.007.
- Powell, T. G. (February, 1968). Mexican Intellectuals and the Indian Question, 1876-1911. *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, 48(1), pp. 19-36. Doi: 10.2307/2511398.
- Ramírez, L. A. (August, 1994). La Política del Desarrollo Regional en Yucatán. Descentralización Administrativa y Empresariado. *Estudios Demográficos y Urbanos*, 9(2), pp. 381-393. Retrieved January 14, 2020, from <https://estudiosdemograficosyurbanos.colmex.mx/index.php/edu/article/view/914/907>.
- Ramírez-Pasillas, M., & Lundberg, H. (2019). Corporate Social Venturing: An Agenda for Researching the Social Dimension of Corporate Venturing by Family-Owned Businesses. In Saiz-Alvarez, J. M. & Palma-Ruiz, J. M. (Eds.), *Handbook of Research on Entrepreneurial Leadership and Competitive Strategy in Family Business* (pp. 173-192). Hershey: IGI Global. Doi: 10.1108/IJ-05-2019-012-6.

- Ramírez-Pasillas, M., Lundberg, H., & Nordqvist, M. (July, 2018). Everyday Practices of Corporate Venturing. *Academy of Management Annual Meeting Proceedings, 1*, pp. 1-40. Doi:AMBPP2018.18120abstract.
- Ramírez-Pasillas, M., Waldkirch, M., Dana, L-P., & Lundberg, H. (2019). *Mexican Spirit(s): A Study of Indigenous Family Entrepreneurship*. Conference Paper presented at the International Family Enterprise Research Academy Annual Conference. Bergamo, Italy.
- The World Bank Group. (2013). *Corruption and PPPs: Challenges and Solutions*. Washington DC: The World Bank Group. Retrieved January 14, 2020 from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOI/Resources/Corruption_and_PPPs_background.pdf.
- Wells, A. (May, 1982). Family Elites in a Boom-and-Bust Economy: The Molinas and Peóns of Porfirian Yucatán. *The Hispanic American Historical Review, 62*(2), pp. 224-253. Doi: 10.2307/2514979.
- Wells, A. (May, 1992). All in the Family: Railroads and Henequen Monoculture in Porfirian Yucatán. *The Hispanic American Historical Review, 72*(2), pp. 159-209. Doi:10.2307/2515554.
- Yoder, M. S. (1993). The Latin American Plantation Economy and the World-Economy: The Case of the Yucatecan Henequen Industry. *Review (Fernand Braudel Center), 16*(3), pp. 319-337. Retrieved January 20, 2020 from www.jstor.org/stable/40241261.
- Zahra, S.A., Gedajlovic, E., Neubaum, D. O., & Shulman, J. M. (September, 2009). A Typology of Social Entrepreneurs: Motives, Search Processes and Ethical Challenges. *Journal of Business Venturing, 24*(5), pp. 519-532. Doi: j.jbusvent.2008.04.007.